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Deep Water Offshore Oil Exploration
Regulation: The Need For a Global
Environmental Regulation Regime
Naama Hasson*
Abstract
Government regulation of deepwater offshore explorations has
found it either difficult to evaluate the environmental impact, or too costly
to perform the required review.1 Corporate self-regulation without effective
government oversight will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents
within the offshore oil exploration industry, nor will it ensure that
corporations prepare effectively to respond to a major spill. The potential,
near-term, financial benefit for the oil company prevails over the lowprobability risk that a major spill will occur.
Recognizing that current domestic regulation lacks effective,
continuous monitoring of complex offshore operations, another form of
regulation appears necessary. If already-emerging principles were to be
recognized within industry and governmental agencies on the international
level, this would help achieve safer operations in areas where domestic
environmental regulation is weak or non-existent.
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1.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT],
available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report (discussing the various policy
complications and technological limitations contributing to the failure of effective deepwater
monitoring).
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I. Introduction
As of the 1890s, oil companies began drilling offshore from
wooden piers connected to shore. 2 In the 1940s drilling detached from
shore, operating within a few miles at relatively shallow depths.3 Shell was
the first company to develop new technology that allowed offshore oil and
gas exploration in deep water during the 1960s (at 300–600 feet).4 This
opened the door to increased operations and the development of new
technologies, which, in turn, allowed for deeper offshore oil explorations.5
Current offshore oil and gas exploration projects are occurring in
ever-growing depths of in and over 5,000 feet. 6 British Petroleum’s
Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling the Macondo well in the Gulf of
Mexico at 4,992 feet. 7 Noble Energy’s Tamar rig is drilling in the
Mediterranean Sea at 5,500 feet.8 Petrobras’ Ocean Clipper rig is drilling
offshore Brazil at 8,500 feet. 9 Dragon Oil’s Astra rig is drilling in the

2.
See id. at 21 (“Beginning in the 1890s, oil companies had drilled wells in the
ocean, but from wooden piers connected to shore.”).
3.
See id. at 24 (discussing Kerr-McGee Oil’s first productive “out-of-sight-of-land”
well platform, built in 1948).
4.
See id. at 25 (detailing Shell’s advent of the “floating drilling platform.”).
5.
See id. (discussing the far-reaching implications of Shell’s deepwater drilling
innovations).
6.
See id. at 37 (“Drilling contractors developed a new generation of vessels that took
drilling from 5,000 to 10,000 feet of water, and from 20,000 to 30,000 feet of sub-seafloor
depth.”).
7.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT 25 (Jan. 2011)
COUNSEL’S
REPORT],
available
at
[hereinafter
CHIEF
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/chief-counsels-report (discussing BP’s well depths).
8.
See Operations, Eastern Mediterranean, Noble Energy, Inc., (Nov. 2009),
available
at
http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/PDFs/MISC/FINAL_Israel_article_O&
G_Investor_Magazine.pdf?FileName=FINAL_Israel_article_O%26G_Investor_Magazine.p
df (discussing the Tamar rig’s depth levels).
Rig
Data:
Ocean
Clipper,
9.
See
RIGZONE,
http://www.rigzone.com/data/rig_detail.asp?rig_id=566 (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (listing
data pertaining to the Ocean Clipper) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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Caspian Sea at about 14,770 feet.10 Expanding the operation into the depths
of the sea, however, brings with it bigger, sometimes unknown, risks.
Deepwater, offshore oil and gas exploration occurs at a significant
distance from land and at distances, depths and pressures that require
sophisticated inspection systems in order to scan and monitor the operation
of mechanics.11 This operation has the potential to be highly lucrative, but
also extremely fraught. Once a major oil spill has occurred at the depth, it is
almost uncontainable.12 It is difficult to identify that a spill has occurred, to
locate its origin, and finally to bring the spill to a halt—indeed, deepwater
repairs have been described as “open-heart surgery at 5,000 feet, in the
dark.”13 Following the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) blowout, five million
barrels of crude oil continued to spill into the ocean water for almost three
months. 14 The damage caused to the ecologic system will take years to
assess and overcome.15
In May 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling.16 The Recommendation of the Commission recognized
that the oil industry has regional effects beyond state boundaries.17 There is
10.
See
Dragon
Oil Operating and Financial Review 2
(2010),
http://dragonoil.annualreport2010.com/performance/operating-and-financial-review
(detailing Astra’s depth level at 4,502 meters, or 14,770 feet) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
11.
See CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing the challenges and
opportunities of deepwater drilling).
12.
See Mike Soraghan, Industry Claims of Proven Technology Went Unchallenged at
TIMES
(June
2
2012),
available
at
MMS,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/02/02greenwire-industry-claims-of-proventechnology-went-unch-55514.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the difficulties of responding
to events in a deepwater setting).
13.
See id.
14.
See Thomas B. Ryerson, et al., Chemical Data Quantify Deepwater Horizon
Hydrocarbon Flow Rate and Environmental Distribution, PNAS (Jan. 2012),
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/01/04/1110564109.full.pdf+html (discussing the
after-effects of the Macondo well blowout) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
15.
See Oil Rig’s Owner Settles With Justice Dept. in Spill Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 3,
2013),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_20
10/index.html (discussing ex post facto settlement claims) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
16.
See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Weekly
Address: President Obama Establishes Bipartisan National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (May 22, 2010), [hereinafter Press
Release] available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-presidentobama-establishes-bipartisan-national-commission-bp-deepwa (announcing the creation of
the Commission).
17.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, RECOMMENDATIONS 36 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter Recommendations of the National
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little known on the environmental effect of a major oil spill on deepwater
ecologic systems and on aquatic species.18 Further, deepwater oil and gas
exploration occurs at a distance from the coastal state, which has an effect
on a shared global water resource and, as such, becomes a joint interest for
the international community.19 Finally, since the damage from a major oil
spill is likely to be significant and costly, governments may find themselves
operating cleanup programs after oil spills, as eventually happened in the
BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico. For all of these reasons, there is an
incentive for governments to closely regulate offshore oil and gas
explorations in order to decrease, to the extent possible, the risk of a major
spill.20
This Paper suggests that offshore oil exploration projects should be
administered based on a global environmental regulatory regime. It will
examine recent reports regarding environmental regulation of offshore
drilling published in the United States21 and the United Kingdom,22 as well
as ‘good oilfield practices,’ developed throughout years of offshore
exploration by oil companies, in order to establish a list of preliminary
basic principles in establishing a global environmental regulatory regime on
deep water offshore oil and gas exploration. Part II will delineate the main
existing obligations under the law of the sea in the area where deepwater
explorations are being performed. Part III will examine regulation options
by the governments, self-regulation by oil companies, and global
regulation, drawing from this the justifications to regulating offshore oil
and gas exploration on the international level. Part IV will uncover the
Commission],
available
at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OSC_Deep_Water_Summa
ry_Recommendations_FINAL.pdf (discussing the vast regional effects of the Macondo
spill).
18.
See id. at 52–53 (“When the Macondo blowout dumped enormous volumes of oil
into the Gulf waters, scientists and policymakers realized how little was known about
biological systems, environmental conditions, and even key aquatic and coastal species.”).
19.
See id. at 4–6 (emphasizing the importance of working with the international
community to develop shared standards regarding drilling, production, and emergency
response).
20.
See id. at vii (“Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the
frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been
adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the future.”).
21.
See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, note 1 (detailing the full sequence of
events leading to the blowout of the Macondo well, and the spectrum of measures that might
be implemented to prevent future such incidents).
22.
See 1 HOUSE OF COMMONS, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK
DEEPWATER DRILLING—IMPLICATIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL, 10–13 (Jan. 6,
2011)
[hereinafter
UK
Report],
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/450i.pdf
(discussing offshore regulations of the United States and United Kingdom in the context of
the Macondo incident).
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‘good oilfield practices,’ and lessons learned from the 2010 BP blowout, in
search for industry and regulators’ policies and practices that should be
incorporated into a global environmental regulatory regime. Part V will
introduce the main principles the global environmental regulatory regime
should include, as well as a suggested incentive mechanism to complement
it. Part VI will conclude the discussion.
II. Obligations under the Law of the Sea
The status of the adjacent water and, subsequently, the seabed
underneath it has been the subject of international debate for a while. The
General Assembly resolution 2692 (XXV) on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources of Developing Countries included reference to the right
of states to permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the superjacent
water.23 This was reaffirmed in a later resolution, recognizing the right of
states to permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the seabed and the
subsoil in the superjacent waters. 24 However, behind the scenes at the
United Nations, the inclusion of the superjacent waters and its definition
were the subject of long discussions in the General Assembly.25 Some of
the countries there expressed their concern that the law of the sea is still
evolving and being discussed as part of the process of drafting several
conventions on the law of the sea.26
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
divided the sea into zones, each subject to a different legal status and
applicable law. 27 A state’s territorial sea extends out to twelve nautical
miles from the coast28 where the sovereignty of the coastal state continues
to apply. The contiguous zone stretches to twenty-four nautical miles.
Within this area, the coastal State may exercise its control, as necessary, to

23.
See G.A. Res. 2692 (XXV), 25th Sess. (Dec. 11, 1970) (“Recognizing also the
necessity for all countries to exercise fully their rights so as to secure the optimal utilization
of their natural resources, both land and marine, for the benefit and welfare of their peoples
and for the protection of their environment . . . .”).
24.
See G.A. Res. 3016 (XXVII), 27th Sess., Doc. A/RES/3016 (Dec. 18, 1972), and
G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 28th Sess. (Dec. 17, 1973) (reaffirming states’ sovereign rights to
natural resources found in the sea-bed and the subsoil within their national jurisdictions and
the superjacent waters).
25.
See U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1926th plen. mtg. at 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/PV/1926
(Dec. 11, 1970); U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2203d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV/2203 (Dec. 17,
1973).
26.
See id.
27.
See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (establishing demarcated territorial zones for
state signers to the Convention).
28.
See id. art. 3 (establishing the breadth of territorial waters).

282

4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 277 (2013)

prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations.29
The Continental Shelf “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”30 Jurisdiction over
the continental shelf is defined functionally, asserting the state holds
exclusive control for limited purposes of exploration and exploitation of
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.31
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea, where the coastal state holds sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the
natural resources. 32 In addition to jurisdiction over seabed and subsoil
resources, which are already covered by the continental shelf rule, the EEZ
regime establishes state jurisdiction over natural resources in the water
(mainly fisheries). 33
Most offshore oil explorations take place within the EEZ, at the
continental shelf seabed and subsoil.34 Within this area, the coastal state has
jurisdiction as required for the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources.35 However, this is subject to the state’s responsibility to ensure,
through proper conservation and management measures, that the
maintenance of the living resources within the EEZ is not endangered by
over-exploitation.36 This suggests that the coastal state has an obligation

29.
See id. art. 33 (establishing the rights of a nation to engage in zones contiguous to
its territorial seas).
30.
See id. art. 76(1) (defining the continental shelf).
31 See Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea, 104
AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 584–85 (2010) (explaining the functional jurisdiction principle of the
Convention as it pertains to the continental shelf).
32.
See UNCLOS, supra note 27, at. 55–56 (defining the area, rights, jurisdiction, and
duties of the exclusive economic zone).
33.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 585 (“In addition to seabed resources that
are in any event covered by the continental shelf regime, the EEZ regime establishes the
coastal state's exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources in the water column, notably
fisheries.”).
34.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 585 (“[M]ost exploitable deposits of
hydrocarbons are likely to be found within the limits of the continental shelf as defined in
UNCLOS . . . .”).
35.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 585 (noting that exclusive jurisdiction of the
continental shelf mitigates inefficient races to control resources there, while UNCLOS grants
“similar exclusive rights for the EEZ”).
36.
See UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 61 (“The coastal State, taking into account the
best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and

DEEP WATER OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION REGULATION

283

under international law to protect and conserve living resources from
impacts of development operations occurring within the EEZ.37
III. Justifications for regulation of offshore drilling on the International
Level
Recognizing that the current domestic regulation is lacking
effective continuous monitoring of complex operations far from land,
another form of regulation is required. Still, there is a myriad of regulatory
methods regularly used to monitor environmental issues.38 This chapter will
review available systems of regulation and will draw from this discussion
justifications for regulating offshore oil and gas exploration on the
international level. First, the paper will turn to examine the traditional
government regulation, usually in the form of command and control. 39
Later, the possibility of incorporating incentives to induce self-regulation
by oil companies will be considered. 40 Finally the characteristics of the
offshore oil and gas exploration industry will be analyzed to find whether
an international regulation is applicable.41
A. Government regulation
Government oversight alone cannot reduce the risks of
overexploitation and environmental impact to the full extent possible. 42
Resources at the deep sea require regulation to avoid overexploitation,
excessive investment in search, and related externality issues.43 However,
there is an inverse relationship between the value of sea resources and the
cost of regulation for land-based actors: as the value of sea resources tends
to diminish, the cost of regulating that resource rises with distance from the
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation.”).
37.
See UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 61 (imposing the conservation and management
requirement on coastal states).
38.
See infra notes 42–92 and accompanying text (discussing modes of regulation
using federal, private, and international means).
39.
See infra notes 42–65 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
government regulation over distant deepwater drilling sites).
40.
See infra notes 66–87 and accompanying text (discussing economic and public
relations incentives for companies to police themselves).
41.
See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing prospects for a global
environmental regime).
42.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 217 (stating that effective
government oversight is necessary to avoid accidents and to ensure effective response, but
insufficient without the reinvention of the oil and gas industry).
43.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 595 (“[M]any of the resources of the sea
require regulation to protect against overexploitation, excessive investment in search, and
related externality problems.”).
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shore. 44 It follows, therefore, that a coastal state’s “regulatory authority
declines with distance from the shore.”45 This makes it difficult for a state
regulator to evaluate a cost of harming fish species, birds, or water quality,
where people never go. 46 It is also hard to justify research of deep-sea
aquatic ecosystems, as this kind of research requires sophisticated
technologies, which are very expensive.47
As offshore oil and gas explorations are technologically possible in
greater depths and distances with growing technological development, the
domestic regulatory authority is less operative.48 The core challenge for an
international agreement on regulatory authority over activities at sea is to
allocate that authority to the most efficient regulator.49 The logic underlined
in the law of the sea is that the further away from the coast, the more the
international community would be involved in the management of the
resource, with the high seas representing total freedom from state
sovereignty.50 While the EEZ is subject to the coastal state sovereignty, the
international community has an interest in the activities performed within
the EEZ.51 This interest is reflected in the responsibility of the coastal state
to ensure, through proper conservation and management measures, that
living resources are maintained within the EEZ.52

44.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 595 (“[T]he value of a sea resource to landbased actors tends to diminish with distance from the shore, and the cost of regulating that
resource for land-based actors rises with distance from the shore.”).
45.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 595.
46.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 577 (noting that states may be reluctant to
expend resources to police a vast area of the high seas without substantial return, while “the
environmental costs of activities further out to sea are not (yet) perceived to be as serious”).
47.
See Laura Ruth, Gambling in the Deep Sea, 7 EMBO REPORTS 17, 18 (2006)
(noting that commercial partnerships are often necessary to support academic deep-sea
research, which can cost $30,000 per day and six-figure sums over the course of a year).
48.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 250–51 (discussing the inadequacy
of current regulatory systems in the face of “the near certainty that the oil and gas industry
will seek to expand into ever more challenging environments in the years ahead”).
49.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 576 (noting that allocating regulatory
authority to proximate coastal states is usually the efficient choice, but this assumption may
not hold where competing claims and distant resources are involved).
50.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 578–80 (discussing how state maritime
rights and control diminish with distance from shore, and how the principle of freedom on
the high seas results in an international regime of rights and duties).
51.
See Posner & Sykes, supra note 31, at 585 (noting that UNCLOS grants coastal
states exclusive rights of exploitation and conservation of maritime resources in the EEZ, but
that foreign states retain high seas rights in these areas, as well as an attenuated interest in
fishery resources).
52.
See UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 61 (“The coastal State, taking into account the
best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation.”).
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The above theoretical analysis of the law of the sea can explain the
degradation in environmental regulation of offshore oil and gas
explorations in the Gulf of Mexico. Compared with other regions in the
world, the United States has elaborate government regulation: the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)53 requires all major federal actions that
will significantly affect the quality of the human environment to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS).54 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA) gives the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the Department of the Interior the
authority and responsibility to approve oil and gas leasing, exploration, and
development process in the outer continental shelf.55 BOEMRE was then
split into two separate entities; the new Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM) and the new Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE). The authority and responsibility to approve oil and
gas leasing, exploration, and development process in the outer continental
shelf remained with BOEM.56 The process of approval is divided into four
stages: (1) preparation of a five year program, (2) planning for specific
lease sales, (3) a private company’s exploration plan approval, and (4)
approval of a company’s development and production plan. 57 OCSLA
requires that BOEMRE only permit offshore oil and gas activities that
comply with NEPA.58 BOEMRE would regularly conduct a NEPA review
at each stage of the oil and gas exploration process, requiring an EIS to be
submitted by the oil company at each stage of the process.59 However, the
53.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2011).
54.
See id. at § 4332 (imposing on federal agencies NEPA’s reporting and consultation
requirements, including the EIS).
55.
See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 5, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2011) (“The
Secretary shall administer the provisions of this subchapter relating to the leasing of the
outer Continental Shelf . . . .”); see Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 11, 43 U.S.C. §
1340 (2011) (providing for management of geological explorations in the outer Continental
Shelf by the Secretary of the Interior); see Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 25, 43
U.S.C. §1351 (2011) (providing for secretarial review of development plans).
56.
See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Fact Sheet: The BSEE and BOEM Separation, An
Independent Safety, Enforcement and Oversight Mission, available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/01-19-11_Fact-Sheet-BSEE-BOEMseparation-2.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (describing the restructuring of BOEMRE and
the authority granted to each agency).
57.
See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON THE
OUTER
CONTINENTAL
SHELF,
at
3–7,
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/5BOE
MRE_Leasing101.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (describing the process from the five-year
program through development review).
58.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend, modify, or repeal any provision
of . . . the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . .”).
59.
See OIL AND GAS LEASING ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 57, at 3
(noting that BOEM prepares an EIS in the course of developing a five-year program and
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Gulf of Mexico has been categorically excluded from NEPA review in the
approval of offshore lease exploration, development and production plans,
and development operation coordination documents.60
According to BOEM, the primary justification for the categorical
exclusion of exploration plans in the Gulf of Mexico is that hundreds of
Environmental Assessments (EAs) were prepared for oil and gas
explorations in the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico.61 Previous EAs
found no possibility of significant impacts from drilling, therefore, it
appears that future drilling would not pose a significant impact.62 Others
have suggested that the thirty day timeframe for responding to an
application of an exploration plan does not allow for a full NEPA review.63
Whatever the actual reason, it is clear that there is degradation in
environmental regulation of offshore oil and gas explorations in the Gulf of
Mexico; despite having an elaborate regulation system, when it came to
distant deepwater explorations, the governing authority found it either
difficult to evaluate the environmental impact, or too costly to perform the
required review to figure it out.64

planning a specific sale); Jaclyn Lopez, BP’s Well Evaded Environmental Review:
Categorical Exclusion Policy Remains Unchanged, 37 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 93, 95 (2010)
(stating that the leasing companies’ exploration plans are subject to NEPA review in the
form of an EA, while development and production plans are subject to NEPA review as an
EIS); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1351(e), (h) (providing that at least one production plan in each area shall
be declared Federal action subject to NEPA review, and that such plans will be approved,
rejected, or subject to modification based on that review).
60.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1351(l) (2006) (leaving the decision whether to apply NEPA
review of leases to the Secretary’s discretion); Lopez, supra note 59, at 95 (stating that
Interior Department policy has been to exclude categorically the exploration, development,
and production plans from NEPA review).
61.
See Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, National
Environmental
Policy
Act
(NEPA)—Categorical
Exclusion
Reviews,
http://www.boem.gov/Environmental-Stewardship/EnvironmentalAssessment/NEPA/policy/ce/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (“[H]undreds of
Environmental Assessments (EAs) were prepared for approval of certain types of oil and gas
exploration and development and production plans in the Central and Western Gulf of
Mexico.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
62.
See id. (“If a certain type of BOEM action . . . would not normally result in any
environmental effects that are potentially significant, it is unnecessary to expend resources to
repeatedly document that fact.”); Lopez, supra note 59, at 97 (“[BOEM] appears to have
concluded that because the previous EAs found no possibility of significant impacts from
drilling, no future drilling would ever pose significant impacts.”).
63.
See Lopez, supra note 59, at 97 (“Others have suggested that the categorical
exclusion policy is necessary in light of OCSLA Section 11 requirement that the MMS
approve or deny an exploration plan within thirty days, which means it only has thirty days
to complete an environmental review.”).
64.
See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S
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B. Self-regulation
Corporate self-regulation is enjoying a growing support as an
approach to environmental compliance mechanisms.65 The oil industry has
shifted its working model throughout the years: from an industrial culture
of evading international standards to a compliance culture, where
companies complied with minimum regulation, to the current safety culture,
in which companies constantly strive to improve their safety measures as a
means to promote productivity and profitability.66 This type of regulation
suggests that a mechanism of incentives may be established to enable and
require oil companies to regulate their own operation.67
Under domestic jurisdiction the benefits of self-regulation are
mainly that corporations may enjoy “tangible benefits of compliance, such
as avoiding the high cost and fines of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) enforcement actions . . . and EPA-mandated compliance
programs.” 68 Also, corporate managers may rely on the companies’
compliance plan to avoid personal liability.69 However, based on corporate
self-regulation alone, “without effective government oversight, the offshore
oil [exploration] industry will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents,
nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies” such as a major spill.70
An example of the inability of oil companies to regulate their own
activity can be found in a Shell Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY
RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT, at 17–
19 (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf (noting that in the context of BP’s Macondo
well, the former Minerals Management Service relied on a multi-sale EIS in the lease sale, did
not prepare a site-specific impact analysis during NEPA review, and did not prepare an analysis
for BP’s exploration plan during categorical exclusion review).
65.
See Dennis H. Esposito & Jenna Algee, A Common Sense Approach to Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 60 R.I. B. J. 5, 5 (2012) (arguing that environmental compliance
policies “should be viewed as a prudent investment and as insurance” against significant
monetary fines and personal criminal liability resulting from noncompliance).
66.
See Barbara E. Ornitz, Oil Spill Prevention and Response: A Model for a
Developing Marine Ethic in the Shipping Industry, in VALUES AT SEA: ETHICS FOR THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT 183, 183 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 2003) (noting this shift in the
industry as a result of external regulatory pressures and public attitudes).
67.
See id. at 191–92 (stating that because “[e]conomics is a prime motivator for the
shipping industry,” imposing costs on polluters and rewarding best practices in accident
response produces a safer culture and more effective regulation).
68.
Esposito & Algee, supra note 65, at 5.
69.
See Esposito & Algee, supra note 65, at 5 (“The best defense against most
deficiencies targeted in environmental enforcement actions is an effective Environmental
Compliance Program (ECP) with routine compliance.”).
70.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 217.
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from 2000.71 The report was filed under the OCSLA because Shell found
that “the potential for a high-volume blowout during the proposed activities
may have highly controversial environmental effects.”72
Shell identified in the report that “the likelihood of spills from loss
of control (blowouts) in deep water may be different from the risk of spills
in shallow water,” and that “[f]urther investigation is required before the
consequences of blowouts in deep water can be fully evaluated.”73 These
statements recognize that oil exploration projects in deepwater areas may
raise greater risks and difficulties in controlling a spill.74 Different model
assessments were performed from 1995 to 1997 to research the impacts of
subsurface spills and the areal extent that the formation oil would reach
once at the sea surface.75 These reports reached distinct results as to the
probability oil would reach the water’s surface and how far from the
drilling the oil could appear.76
The S.L. Ross Environmental Research paper found that in
blowouts at depths greater than 900 meters (about 2,950 feet), all
discharged gas will quickly convert to solid hydrate (crystalline solids
formed under pressure when coming to contact with water). 77 The
discharged oil will be shattered into droplets and saturated with gas, later
forming a rigid hydrate shell around the oil. 78 These oil droplets will
continue rising to the sea surface at a speed of their regular buoyancy

71.
See generally Shell Deepwater Development Inc., Document no. N-6570, SiteSpecific Environmental Assessment: Initial Development Operations Coordination
Document Green Canyon Area, Blocks 158 and 202 (May 9, 2000) available at
http://www.data.bsee.gov/PI/PDFImages/PLANS/1/1263.pdf.
72.
Id. at 1.
73.
Id. at App. D-3.
74.
See id. at App. D-4–D-5, D-9–D10 (describing the measures needed to contain a
deepwater blowout and the uncertain behavior of leaking oil in such a scenario).
75.
See generally Henrik Rye & Per Johan Brandvik, Verification of Subsurface Oil
Spill Models, in: Proceedings, 1997 International Oil Conference, American Petroleum
Institute
Publication
No.
4651,
551
(1997),
available
at
http://ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1997-1-551;
S.L.
Ross
Environmental Research Ltd., Fate and Behavior of Deepwater Subsea Oil Well Blowouts in
the Gulf of Mexico, Minerals Managements Service (1997), available at
http://bsee.gov/Research-and-Training/Technology-Assessment-and-Research/Project287.aspx. Both reports are mentioned in Shell’s EA.
76.
See generally Rye & Brandvik, supra note 75 (discussing the behavior of slicks,
and whether they will come to the surface, through numerous case studies).
77.
See S.L. Ross Environmental Research, supra note 75, at 20 (“Blowouts at depths
greater than 900 meters will result in a very fast conversion of all of the gas to hydrate.”).
78.
See S.L. Ross Environmental Research, supra note 75, at 20 (“The discharged oil
will be shattered into small droplets and will be saturated with gas. As the gas devolves from
the oil as it rises hydrates will likely form a rigid shell around the oil droplet.”).
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(depending on the size of each droplet).79 They will reach the surface within
three to fifteen hours of the initial spill, depending on the oil density and
release depth.80
An experiment performed by Rye and Brandvik also examined
subsurface oil release and, in particular, the size of the plume a spill would
create on the surface. Their results showed that subsurface plume might not
reach the sea surface at all.81 If it does reach the sea surface, it is likely to
form a relatively thin surface slick spread over a larger area.82 This should
eventually accelerate the rate of oil dissolution.83 However, the trials they
performed were at a depth of up to 107 meters (about 351 feet),84 which is
not nearly as deep as the exploration permit Shell is requesting.
Despite recognizing that the likelihood of blowouts in deep water
may be different from the likelihood in shallow water, their highly
controversial environmental effects, and lack of scientific knowledge on the
behavior of oil and gas chemicals following a subsurface blowout, Shell
submitted an EA requesting a permit for an even deeper exploration of
2,895 feet.85 The potential financial benefit in the near future for the oil
company prevailed over the low risk a major spill will occur. The option of
relinquishing potential financial benefits for some vague and distant risk
would almost seem irrational for an oil company to consider. From the
industry point of view, the probabilities are favorable.86

79.
See S.L. Ross Environmental Research, supra note 75, at 20 (“Because the density
of the hydrate is very close to that of water, it will not affect the buoyancy of the oil
droplet.”).
80.
See S.L. Ross Environmental Research, supra note 75, at 22 (describing case two
of blowouts at depths greater than 900 meters).
81.
See Rye & Brandvik, supra note 75, at 555 (“Thus the oil droplets may have been
trapped within the subsurface plume instead of rising to the sea surface.”).
82.
See Rye & Brandvik, supra note 75, at 555 (“However, the thickness was found to
be about 10 to 30 µm, accounting for only 15% to 20% of the total amount of oil released.”).
83.
See Rye & Brandvik, supra note 75, at 555 (“This velocity may be large enough to
create small droplets with a small rise velocity.”).
84.
See Rye & Brandvik, supra note 75, at 551 (“The first field exercise involved the
release of 25 m3 of oil at 107-m depth . . . and the 1996 field exercise . . . at 102-m depth . .
.”).
85.
See Shell Deepwater Development Inc., supra note 71, at 2 (proposing a
development site 2,895 feet below sea level).
86.
See Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There
Ought to be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11033, 11034 (2010) (“From the
industry point of view, and indeed from any gambler’s point of view, the probabilities were
favorable. Not one major blowout had occurred in 37 years from American operations in the
deep Gulf, they would claim, before and after the event.”).
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C. Global regulation

The characteristics of the oil industry entail a unified global
approach to assess, regulate, and develop safety measures.87 Global oil and
gas companies operate in various locations under different regulatory
regimes. 88 This could create a situation where companies exploit weak
countries’ lack of regulation, exploring recklessly and applying old
technology. 89 The offshore oil exploration industry has long been
considered a global industry and should be regarded as such by regulating
authorities.90 The United Kingdom report also recognized the need to work
with regulators in other offshore oil and gas provinces to ensure that the
highest standards of safety can be achieved globally through an exchange of
best practice lessons. 91 Therefore, a global environmental regime can
empower governments when regulating the industry, making information
from regulators around the world available to them.
ExxonMobil’s announcement that it has incorporated a marine well
containment system improving capabilities for containing an underwater
well control incident in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico is an example for
companies employing different measures under different regulatory
regimes. 92 This innovative safety measure only operates in the Gulf of
Mexico, and could indicate that oil companies apply different means in
different explorations.93 The Gulf of Mexico was subject to a moratorium
following the 2010 BP blowout, and oil companies operating there tried to
prove that they were employing groundbreaking technologies to avoid
87.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 43–44 (describing the movement
toward global restructuring and mergers of oil companies in the late 1990s).
88.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 66 (“What began as a policy
allowing offshore drilling in the Gulf under a more relaxed regulatory regime than applied
elsewhere gradually became a policy of allowing offshore drilling, as a practical matter,
almost only in the Gulf.”).
89.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at x (“To date, we have made the
decision as a nation to exploit the Gulf’s offshore energy resources—ruling much of the
Florida, Atlantic, and Pacific coasts out of bounds for drilling.”).
90.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 44 (“During this era, offshore oil
exploration and production became an increasingly global enterprise.”).
91.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 20 (“We would urge the Government to work
with regulators in other offshore oil and gas provinces to ensure that the highest standards of
safety can be achieved globally through an exchange of best practice lessons.”).
92.
See
Marine
Well
Containment
System,
EXXONMOBIL,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Imports/mwc/safety_response_mwc.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2013) (describing the containment system operations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); see also Safety in
Our Operations, EXXONMOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/safety_ops.aspx
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (describing general safety principles) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
93.
See Marine Well Containment System, supra note 92 (stating that the Marine Well
Containment System only operates in the Gulf of Mexico).
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similar blowouts in the future.94 The problem with giving special attention
to one region is that projects in other regions are left behind or their safety
development is held back to cover the expenses for developing safety
mechanisms for highly-regulated regions.95
The argument is not that global regulation should completely
replace government authority or oil company’s safety development policies.
But a global regime can guide governments and oil companies in
establishing practices, reviewing processes, and preventing degradation in
regulation practices. 96 In the ExxonMobil example, this regime could
encourage companies to apply the same policies globally and could direct
the governments to compare safety policies employed in their region to
those employed in other regions.
In conclusion, a global regime would minimize existing difficulties
in government regulation and in self-regulation by oil companies. The
international community holds a significant interest in preserving living
resources within the EEZ, where the coastal state lacks competence to
evaluate harm. Where oil companies cannot rationally hold back their
operations for distant risk in fear of being left behind by other companies, it
will assure equal limitations (so that when Shell reports a risk, all such
explorations will be affected, and not only its lease). Finally, it will prevent
the risk of over-exploitation and use of old technologies in regions where
regulation is weak or non-existent.
IV. Best Practices and Procedures
Existing environmental safety practices are a good place to start
exploring for principles to guide the practice of oil and gas explorations.
Later, we can consider whether they should constitute part of the global
environmental regulation regime. This chapter will review industry
practices, as well as regulatory recommendations reached following the BP
blowout.
A. Industry ‘good oilfield practice’
The oil industry has developed its own safety model and regulation
over the years. Although clearly not sufficient to regulate the activity, the

94.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 152 (describing the moratorium
imposed and oil companies’ reactions to it).
95.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 153 (noting the focus on Louisiana
and subsequent failure to adequately provide safety measures for Florida).
96.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 242 (claiming that an industrywide commitment to rigorous auditing and continuous improvement would include
measurements against global benchmarks).
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future global environmental regulation regime can learn and absorb much
from these years of practice.
BP indicates three principles at the heart of its safety approach: (1)
fostering a culture focusing on safety, on managing and reducing risk and
on safe, reliable and compliant operations; (2) establishing an operating
management system (OMS) with expectations of conduct and leadership
approach; (3) independent, effective checks and balances and selfverification being carried out at all levels of the organization.97 BP is also
sharing its experience and knowledge from the recent spill in the Gulf of
Mexico to help develop the enhanced capabilities and practices needed to
prevent this type of accident from recurring.98
Shell also wishes to create a culture of safety, incorporating
ongoing training for employees. The company identifies three principles
central to safety: (1) do no harm to people; (2) protect the environment; and
(3) comply with internal health, safety, security, and environment laws and
regulations. 99 The company is also preparing emergency reaction plans,
including a global response for major spills.100 Shell’s global emergency
reaction plan indicates that once a major spill has occurred it would require
all available measures to handle the spill. 101 It also shows that in the
companies’ view, the operation under different countries is merely a
technical one.102
Noble Energy generally concentrates on continuous improvement
of environmental performance, internal responsibility, and preservation of
97.
See SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2011, BP, 31, (2011), available at
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e_s_ass
ets_2010/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2011.pdf (stating BP’s approach to
safety).
98.
See
generally
A
Culture
of
Safety,
BP,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9040147&contentId=7073364
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment); Preventing Major Accidents and Oil Spills, BP,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9040149&contentId=7066981
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
2,
available
at
http://www99.
HSSE
in
Shell,
SHELL,
static.shell.com/static/environment_society/downloads/safety/hsse_in_shell_lr.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2013).
100.
See generally Oil Spill Emergency Response, SHELL, available at http://s08.staticshell.com/content/dam/shell/static/environment-society/downloads/safety/oil-spillemergencyresponselr.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (planning for response in case of
emergency).
101.
See id. at 5 (“For response to larger spills we use global resources and mobilise
Shell staff from around the world. Shell has access to oil industry-funded centres that
provide equipment and personnel to manage major spills.”).
102.
See id. (“Shell ensures that adequate resources are maintained for managing
regional and local spills. We cooperate with industry neighbours and local or national
authorities.”).
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wildlife.103 ExxonMobil has incorporated a marine well containment system
improving capabilities for containing an underwater well control incident in
the U.S. Gulf of Mexico.104
Industry practice indicates an increasing concern for environmental
effects from offshore oil and gas exploration. 105 Oil companies consider
possible environmental effects and are progressively more willing to
employ safety measures and incorporate safety policies to avoid
environmental risk.106 However, much of the information is not available to
the public. There is no doubt that oil companies possess valuable
information about safety measures, geologic explorations, and risk
assessments.107 It seems that the competitive oil exploration market has led
oil companies to maintain the information, usually disclosing information to
the regulating authority only when required to do so. 108 While internal
company policies have developed to incorporate innovative safety policies,
they are reluctant to share knowledge with other oil companies, or third
parties that are not considered directly related to the project.109

103.
See
Environment,
Noble
Energy,
http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/responsibility/environment-301.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2013) (“We are committed to conducting our business in a manner that protects the
environment, health and safety (EHS) of our employees and communities. To achieve this,
we strive to comply with EHS laws and minimize injuries and incidents while protecting the
environment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
104.
ExxonMobil,
Safety
in
Our
Operations,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/safety_ops.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment);
ExxonMobil,
Marine
Well
Containment
System,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Imports/mwc/safety_response_mwc.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and
the Environment).
105.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 293–306 (describing the trend
toward considering environmental concerns in the American oil industry).
106.
See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2011, supra note 97 (detailing BP’s new safety
and environmental policies).
107.
See generally SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2011, supra note 97 (showing the
information that BP has to disclose about safety and risk balancing concerns).
108.
See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 144 (“Environmental groups
pressured Nalco, the company that manufactures Corexit, to disclose its formula. Although it
had given the formula to EPA during the pre-listing process, Nalco declined to make the
formula public, citing intellectual property concerns.”).
109.
See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 241 (“Technology and design
apparently are more uniform in nuclear power than in offshore drilling. . . . Director of . . .
(the successor to MMS), cautioned that an INPO-like approach might run into problems if
companies perceived the potential for inspections of offshore facilities to reveal technical
and proprietary and confidential information that companies may be reluctant to share with
one another.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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B. Lessons from the 2010 BP blowout

Operating offshore oil exploration projects, particularly moving
deeper and farther into the sea, increases the risk and scale of a spill.110
Comprehensive reports were published following the BP blowout in the
United States and the United Kingdom, both discussing the regulation of
offshore oil and gas explorations. 111 While it would be impossible to
completely eliminate oil spills, learning from past spills about industry and
regulatory failures could be beneficial in structuring global environmental
regulation regime.
Two approaches were historically applied for offshore oil and gas
exploration regulation. In the United States, the regulatory approach used is
of prescriptive safety standards.112 In the United Kingdom, the prevailing
approach is the safety case approach.113 The prescriptive safety approach in
the United States is founded on specific requirements prescribed by the
relevant government agencies.114 The safety case approach utilized by the
United Kingdom involves an abandonment of safety rules developed by
government agencies and a placement of the key responsibility on the
operator through goal-setting regulations.115
The United States’ regulatory approach to offshore oil and gas
exploration is the outcome of responses to accidents, short-term political
calculations, and lobbying campaigns. 116 Based on the 1953 legislation
110.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at vii (“Deepwater energy
exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for
which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can
and must be prepared in the future.”)
111.
See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at vii (chronicling the history of
U.S. oil and gas regulation).
112.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 68 (noting that the U.S.
Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, which was the federal agency
responsible for the safety of offshore drilling, “subjected oil and gas activities to an array of
prescriptive safety regulations”).
113.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 69 (“All these foreign regulators—
the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada—had previously relied on the kind of
prescriptive approach used in the United States, but in the aftermath of these fatal accidents
in harsh, remote offshore environments, authorities elsewhere concluded that adding a riskbased approach was essential.”).
114.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 72–74 (detailing the requirements
posed by MMS in off-shore drilling).
115.
See John Paterson, The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in Occupational
Health and Safety Offshore, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 369, 371–84 (2011), available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ (detailing the formation UK’s safety approach).
116.
See Juliet Eilperin, Troubled Waters: Federal Oversight of Offshore Oil Drilling,
17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 89, 89 (2012) (“As a result, some of the most critical energy
decisions policymakers have undertaken in recent years have been driven by a myriad of
factors, ranging from short-term political calculations to well-orchestrated lobbying
campaigns.”).
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governing offshore oil explorations, the Interior Department viewed its
authority to prescribe rules “for the prevention of waste and conservation of
natural resources”117 as mostly regarding avoiding waste or destruction of
the oil reservoir. Environmental concerns, in particular to wildlifeendangered species, were under the authority of the Fish and Wildlife
Service.118 Following a blowout in a Union Oil Company well in the Santa
Barbara Channel in January 1969, the Department of Interior toughened the
rules, and Congress began furthering environmental legislation. 119 NEPA
was enacted in 1970. 120 The OCSLA was amended a few years later in
1978.121 This new set of legislation dramatically changed the federal role in
overseeing exploration and exploitation of natural resources on public
lands—including offshore oil explorations.122 The amended OCSLA added
detailed procedures requiring the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a five
year schedule of proposed lease sales, 123 approval of exploration plans
submitted by oil companies, 124 and upon discovery of oil in commercial
quantities, approval of development and production plans.125 The act also
made clear that environmental considerations were a relevant part of the
Secretary’s decision-making. 126 The Secretary would need to balance the
potential for discovery of oil with the potential for environmental
damage.127
117.
43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
118.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 58 (“The Department did announce,
however, that the Fish and Wildlife Service would have to approve all offshore drilling in
wildlife refuges and that oil and gas leasing there that endangered ‘rare’ wildlife species
(like whooping cranes or trumpeter swans) would not be allowed.”).
119.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 58 (“The Interior Department
toughened its rules in response to the spill.”).
120.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 59.
121.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 59.
122.
See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 58–63 (noting the
OCSLA’s “particular significance for federal oversight of offshore drilling”).
123.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (detailing the administration leases and permits).
124.
See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 § 206, 43 U.S.C. §
1340(c)(1) (2012) (“[P]rior to commencing exploration pursuant to any oil and gas lease
issued or maintained under this subchapter, the holder thereof shall submit an exploration
plan to the Secretary for approval.”).
125.
See id. § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2012) (“Prior to development and
production pursuant to an oil and gas lease . . . with respect to which no oil or gas has been
discovered in paying quantities prior to September 18, 1978, the lessee shall submit a
development and production plan . . . to the Secretary.”).
126.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 61 (“At the same time, the statute
also made clear that environmental safeguards are a relevant, important part of the
Secretary’s decisionmaking.”).
127.
See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 § 208, 43 U.S.C.
1344(a)(3) (2012) (“The Secretary shall select the timing and location of leasing . . . so as to
obtain a proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, [and] the potential
for the discovery of oil and gas.”).
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The next major event that led to legislative changes was the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska’s Prince William Sound.128 In response to
the Exxon Valdez spill, the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) added additional
requirements for facility response plans in worst-case scenarios, including
annual training plans, and the identification of facilities technology, and
financing.129
The 2010 BP blowout presented a crisis on a scale for which oil
companies and the United States regulators had not been prepared to
respond. It made clear that changes had to be made in safety and
environmental practices, safety training, drilling technology, containment
and cleanup technology, preparedness, corporate culture, and management
behavior for energy operations to be pursued in the future.130 On May 22,
2010, President Obama announced the creation of an independent
nonpartisan commission to determine the causes of the disaster, to improve
the ability to respond to future spills, and to recommend reforms in offshore
oil and gas drilling regulations.131
The commission identified three major issues that would need to be
addressed in order to improve the safety of offshore operations: (1)
reducing and managing risk effectively using strategies, while keeping pace
with the complex and rapidly evolving industry, especially in high-risk and
frontier areas; (2) assuring the independence and integrity of government
institutions charged with protecting the public interest; and (3) securing
resources for leasing functions and regulatory oversight. 132 These issues
represent a delicate balance between the need to strengthen regulation of
offshore oil and gas exploration, and the interest in maintaining the
conditions for the industry to function and grow, providing the energy
needs of the nation.

128.
See 136 CONG. REC. 6936 (1990) (statement of Rep. Walter Jones, sponsor of the
Oil Pollution Act) (“This biggest oilspill in U.S. history proved what my committee had
been saying for years: we had to completely rewrite and update our woefully inadequate
oilspill laws.”).
129.
See Houck, supra note 86, at 11036 (The OPA, responding to the Exxon Valdez
spill, added additional prescriptions for facility response plans to a worst-case scenario,
including the identification of facilities, technology, and financing.”); see also 30 C.F.R. §
254.5 (2013) (providing general overview of response plan requirements).
130.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 215 (listing changes to industry
practices demanded by the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
131.
See Press Release, supra note 16 (“[T]he purpose of this Commission is to
consider both the root causes of the disaster and [to] offer options on what safety and
environmental precautions we need to take to prevent a similar disaster from happening
again.”).
132.
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 250–51 (describing the three
issues that must be addressed for a successful overhaul of regulatory policies and
organizations).
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The conclusions reached by the commission included a list of
significant changes to the methods of operation and regulation of offshore
oil and exploration.133 The commission recommended reforming regulatory
authorities and requiring the oil industry to take unilateral steps to improve
safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms.134 The
commission also acknowledged the need to incentivize government and
industry cooperation in supporting scientific understanding of
environmental conditions in deep water, as well as development of
innovative technology capable of undertaking the risks associated with
deepwater drilling.135
Following the BP blowout, the United Kingdom published its own
report examining the effect of the BP blowout on offshore oil and gas
exploration regulation in the North Sea.136 The United Kingdom regulatory
approach to offshore oil and gas exploration is the result of a continued
learning process. After finding natural gas under the continental shelf of the
North Sea, the Continental Shelf Act was enacted in 1964. 137 This law
merely applied existing onshore oil exploration regulation to offshore
explorations.138 The next year, a spill from the Sea Gem drilling rig led to
the development of prescriptive regulations for offshore drilling, enacted as
the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act in 1971.139
It was the Piper Alpha disaster, on July 6, 1988, which prompted
the United Kingdom to change its approach completely, and to develop the
“safety case” approach.140 This approach is based on an understanding that
no matter how flexible, safety rules developed by government agencies
cannot provide detailed and comprehensive code covering all aspects of the
industry. 141 Since the industry possesses significantly greater knowledge

133.
See Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at vii–viii
(outlining the Commission’s conclusions).
134.
See Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at vii–viii.
135.
See Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at vii–viii.
136.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining the impetus for the report).
137.
See Paterson, supra note 115, at 371–72 (stating that upon the discovery of natural
gas under the continental shelf, the Continental Shelf Act was enacted in the United
Kingdom).
138.
See Paterson, supra note 115, at 372 (“Once the Continental Shelf Act of 1964 was
passed, the United Kingdom simply lifted the existing onshore regulatory regime for the
exploration and production of oil and gas, which dated from the 1930s, and transferred it to
the offshore environment.”).
139.
See Paterson, supra note 115, at 371–74 (explaining the background of the Mineral
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act).
140.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 9 (“[I]t was from [the Piper Alpha disaster] that
the whole concept of the safety case came and the whole concept of independent verification
and inspection.”).
141.
See Paterson, supra note 115, at 379–80 (“[T]his approach involved an
abandonment of any notion that safety rules developed by government agencies, no matter
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and expertise than the regulator, and offshore oil exploration projects are
characterized by constant technological progress and striving to find and
extract oil and gas from ever more difficult conditions, the government
finds itself at a disadvantage.142 Therefore, companies were required to draft
a “safety case,” relying mainly on the companies’ self-regulation.143
The U.K. commission recommended the government to ensure that
the licensing regime takes full account of high consequence, low
probability events.144 They also urge the need that someone offshore has the
authority to bring a halt to drilling operations at any time, without recourse
to onshore management. 145 While the flexibility of the U.K. safety case
approach appears to have worked well so far, the commission
recommended that fail-safe devices, such as the blowout preventer, which
should be adopted as a minimum prescriptive safety standard.146 This would
suggest that although the operator may be well informed on technology and
best practices in the oil industry, there is still room for prescriptive
requirements when such measures are clearly effective and necessary for
safety operations.
In comparing the United States commission report and the United
Kingdom commission report, it seems that each state took a step toward the
other regulatory approach. As the United States is requiring more selfpolicing mechanisms developed within oil companies, 147 the United
Kingdom acknowledges the necessity to incorporate a minimum
prescriptive safety standard.148
how flexible the form, could provide a detailed and comprehensive code covering all aspects
of the industry.”).
142.
See id. (explaining the rationale of the reforms to the United Kingdom regulatory
regime); see also Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at 1
(“Federal efforts to regulate the offshore oil and gas industry have suffered for years
from . . . a deepening deficit of technical expertise.”).
143.
See Paterson, supra note 115, at 379 (describing the elements of a safety case).
144.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 23 (“We recommend that as part of the drillinglicence process, the Government require companies to consider their responses to highconsequences, low-probability events. . . . We urge the Government to introduce this
requirement as drilling ventures into increasingly extreme environments.”).
145.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 41 (“It is imperative that there is someone
offshore who has the authority to bring a halt to drilling operations at any time, without
recourse to onshore management.”).
146.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 41 (“[W]e recommend that for fail-safe devices
such as the blowout preventer the Government should adopt minimum, prescriptive safety
standards or demonstrate that these would not be a cost-effective, last-resort against
disasters.”).
147.
See Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at 3
(“[Regulators] should shift their focus . . . to a foundation of augmented prescriptive
regulations . . . supplemented by a proactive, risk-based performance approach. . . . This
would be similar to the “safety case” approach that is used in the North Sea.”).
148.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 17 (“[T]he Government should adopt minimum,
prescriptive safety standards.”).
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V. The Global Environmental Regulation Regime
The significant development in technologies of offshore drilling has
transformed the offshore oil and gas exploration industry into a high-risk
industry, making domestic regulation impracticable. A global
environmental regulation regime directing the operation of offshore drilling
can address the incapacities of domestic regulation.
Previous chapters have presented an array of principles currently
employed in the offshore oil exploration industry. A recurring principle
within industry, ‘good oilfield practice’ is the creation and maintenance of a
culture of safety operations.149 The implementation of this principle may
include whistleblower’s protection within the oil industry, constant reevaluation of custom practices, and employees’ orientation.
A second principle arising from industry practice is the
consideration of environmental effect from the exploration.150 This principle
could require a significant scientific research learning the ecologic systems
in the location prior to beginning exploration and actualizing externalities
on the environment into the companies’ decision whether to move forward
with the exploration.
Some oil companies are pursuing innovative technologies
following the BP blowout.151 This would suggest the necessity to employ a
principle of constant innovation and development. Similar
recommendations were made by the U.S. and U.K. commissions following

149.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 20 (“It is important and necessary that the
offshore safety culture is cascaded throughout the supply chain, from existing contractors at
all levels, through to new-entrants on to the UK Continental Shelf.”); REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 217 (“Government oversight must be accompanied by the oil
and gas industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a
fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”).
150.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 12 (recommending the incorporation of
environmental expertise into the management of oil companies); Recommendations of the
National Commission, supra note 17, at 18 (describing possible improvements to the U.S.
regulatory regime that would better protect the environment).
151.
See Chris Lo, After Macondo: Emergency Well Capping, OFFSHORETECHNOLOGY.COM, (Jun. 27, 2011),
http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature122252/
(“[T]he
Marine
Well
Containment Company (MWCC), a non-profit organisation formed after the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and dedicated to improving spill response in the Gulf of Mexico, has
developed a containment system for use in the Gulf in the event of an emergency.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment); Daniel
Schiller, Well-Containment Group Hires Lobbyist, THE SCHILLER REPORT, (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.schillerreport.com/energy-news/well-containment-group-hires-lobbyist/ (stating
that MWCC is a consortium “founded by large oil companies after the 2010 BP spill”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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the BP blowout. 152 This principle would require funding technological
research leading to better practices minimizing the risk of major spills in the
future.
The commissions’ reports also raise the principle of taking into
account high consequence, low probability events.153 This principle should
direct the oil company in assessing the risks posed by its operation, as well
as the government’s regulation agencies in approving such operations.
Finally, both industry and commissions’ reports mention the
principle of information and knowledge exchange. 154 This could require
each project to make available information from environmental assessments
performed prior to beginning exploration, as well as sharing knowledge
with other oil companies, in furtherance of safety. Although nowadays it
may seem illogical that oil companies would share their most innovative
technologies, this has actually happened before. In 1961, Shell developed
the first floating drilling platform, 155 and decided to share the new
technology. 156 For $100,000 each, Shell presented this innovative
technology to competitors.157
This paper suggests that this list of preliminary basic principles
should form the basis for establishing a global environmental regulation
regime on deepwater offshore oil and gas explorations. Since this list of
general principles has emerged from industry practice and government
regulation recommendations, it should be representative of some general
agreement within industry and government officials.
152.
See Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at 6 (“The
federal government has relevant expertise . . . that could and should be transferred to the
offshore industry.”).
153.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 13 (“[W]e are concerned that the offshore oil and
gas industry is responding to disasters, rather than anticipating worst-case scenarios and
planning for high consequence, low-probability events.”); Recommendations of the National
Commission, supra note 17, at 24 (“Oil spill response planning and analysis across the
government needs to be overhauled in light of the lessons of the Deepwater Horizon
blowout.”).
154.
See UK Report, supra note 22, at 42 (“We would urge the Government to work
with regulators in other offshore oil and gas provinces to ensure that the highest standards of
safety can be achieved globally through an exchange of best practice lessons.”);
Recommendations of the National Commission, supra note 17, at 4 (“Transparent
information and data sharing within the offshore industry and among international regulators
is critical to continuous improvement in standards and risk management practices.”).
155.
TYLER PRIEST, THE OFFSHORE IMPERATIVE: SHELL OIL’S SEARCH FOR PETROLEUM
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 97 (2007) (describing the successful testing of a system for keeping a
floating vessel in place without anchors or mooring lines).
156.
See id. at 96 (“Shell had pioneered a whole new frontier in offshore drilling, but it
could not go at it alone. . . . Thus, in January and February 1963, Shell held an
unprecedented three-week ‘school’ on offshore technology for representatives from industry
and government.”).
157.
See id. (The company charged tuition of $100,000 per company, a sizeable
amount of money for the time.”).
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Once the general principles pertinent to a global environmental
regulatory regime have been identified, it will be important to consider
whether countries and oil companies have an interest in supporting its
establishment. The offshore oil and gas industry is clearly a competitive
industry and countries have interests in maintaining a healthy oil market
both to supply energy needs and to protect the economy. However, a major
oil spill poses a threat to those same interests once the risk is realized. The
entire industry is continually assessing risk and attempting to anticipate
potential liabilities associated with technological developments.158
Recognizing the aspect of risk inherently within the operations of
offshore oil and gas exploration, the global environmental regulation
regime should suggest proper incentives for countries to sign the new
document and for oil companies to incorporate it into their internal policies
of operations. One possibility of doing this could be by responding to a
difficulty within the industry to purchase proper insurance for their highrisk operations.
Despite the fact major oil spills threaten to cause widespread loss,
existing insurance options do not provide sufficient coverage of the losses
or liabilities that result from such major spills.159 Low-probability risk with
catastrophic potential magnitude if it materializes (like pollution caused by
a blowout), is not covered by the available insurance. 160 The largest oil
companies often do not purchase the most inclusive insurance to cover their
potential pollution liability, in spite of the fact that they are likely to cause
the largest harm and incur the largest liabilities.161 For example, BP was in
a way self-insured, setting up a $20 billion compensation fund to pay for
the losses caused by the blowout.162
In the case of a major spill, the government will pay significant
amounts for cleanup and liability, effectively rendering the oil company
158.
See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating OilSpill Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717,
1727 (2011) (“The mere magnitudes involved imply significant risk, but beyond that, all
work at the frontiers of technology involves techniques, systems, and equipment that have
not been tested in the field, imposing new risks that are little understood.”).
159.
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of Insurance,
64 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (2011) (“In short, there is a mismatch between the losses
resulting from oil spills, the insurance available to the victims of spills, the liability of the
parties responsible for losses caused by spills, and the insurance available to the parties who
face such liability.”).
160.
See id. at 1771 (describing the gaps in available insurance).
161.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1728 (“Oil spills impose severe
external financial and environmental harms that a profit-maximizing firm will not take into
full account absent liability and/or government sanctions.”).
162.
See Abraham, supra note 159, at 1788 (stating that the fact that BP could set up a
compensation fund to pay for losses suggests that very large enterprises often do not need
full insurance to cover potential liability).
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judgment-proof for extreme accidents. 163 Absent other arrangements,
operators will therefore take excessive risks. 164
A global regime that is able to answer this need of the industry,
providing more predictability through insurance-type mechanism could
attract countries and companies to join. For example, a similar mechanism
to that proposed by Viscusi and Zeckhauser could provide the underlying
incentive to join the global environmental regulation regime.165
The Viscusi and Zeckhauser two-tier liability system creates strong
financial incentives for safety. 166 Applying an analogous mechanism
through the global regime would require oil companies to pay an
international coordination body a Prospective Excess Liability fee.167 The
fee would be relative to each company’s expected external losses imposed
beyond the amount that it will be able to cover by its own funds.168 Once a
company joined the global regime, it would gain access to information,
technologies, and the reputation for taking on the most innovative safety
measures, in addition to insurance. 169 Countries would gain a safely
operated and insured offshore oil and gas exploration industry.170

163.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1724 (“No corporation has sufficient
resources to cover the most extreme potential losses from an accident. In the case of a
megacatastrophe, the government will pay significant amounts and/or losses will go
uncompensated. The operator is essentially judgment proof for extreme accidents.”).
164.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1722 (stating that the limited
potential for liability leads firms to take excessive risk).
165.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1722 (“Our proposal jettisons the
current structure of a low damages cap coupled with ineffective regulation. It replaces that
system with a greatly expanded level of liability coupled with a tax to provide incentives for
risks beyond the liability limit, which we call a two-tier liability system.”).
166.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1722 (“This system creates strong
financial incentives for safety.”).
167.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1753 (explaining that a tax could be
routinely assessed on oil companies, and placed in a compensation fund “not unlike the
current Oil Liability Trust Fund”).
168.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1753 (“[F]or the [tax] to be
workable, one must be able to ascertain the distribution of possible harms. . . . Our proposed
two-tier liability system would rely on . . . the responsible firm to cover damages, with the
money raised by the tax only used for . . . damages exceeding the firm’s financial
resources.”).
169.
See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 158, at 1753 (“[B]y scaling down the
payments to the expected losses rather than the actual losses inflicted, . . . [m]ore companies
will pay for the expected prospective damages, including those that do not experience any
adverse events, thus creating incentives to foster safe drilling operations.”).
170.
It should be mentioned that other insurance mechanisms for major spill risks have
been proposed. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 159, at 1789 (analyzing two such proposals).
However, of those I have read, the Viscusi and Zeckhauser proposal seems the most
adequately applicable to a global regime.
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VI. Conclusions
The offshore oil and gas exploration industry has long operated in
different areas of the world under disparate regulation regimes. The 2010
BP blowout has highlighted the entangled interests that emerge during
major oil spills. A unified, clear, global environmental regulatory regime is
required due to the complexity of these offshore operations, and the
difficulties of monitoring them.
By cooperating more widely to recognize and to operationalize the
emerging principles discussed above, companies and governments could
achieve safer operations in areas where environmental regulation is
currently weak or non-existent. A measurable advancement in safety
through increased international cooperation is especially likely due to the
current weakness of state regulators in developing countries that are
interested in competing to attract large development projects.
Considering the general character of these emerging principles,
they would not be applicable in a legally-binding convention. However, it
might be useful to incorporate the principles into a declaration between
states, endorsed by oil companies as good practice. Including an insurance
mechanism in such a system would create a significant incentive for
countries to sign on to this global regime, and for oil companies to endorse
it. Due to its ability to facilitate greater certainty and a safer industry, such a
regime would positively influence both public and private interests moving
forward.

